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Which democratic oversight on the Banking Union?  
The role of the Euro-national parliamentary system 
  
             NICOLA LUPO- RENATO IBRIDO 
 
ABSTRACT: The essay aims at analysing the instruments of democratic and par-
liamentary oversight on the European Banking Union. It argues that the role of 
the European Parliaments and National Parliaments, as envisaged in Regulation 
(EU) No. 1024/2013 of the Council, in Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council and in the interinstitutional agreements be-
tween the European Parliament, on the one side, and, on the other, the Euro-
pean Central Bank or the Single Resolution Board (published respectively on 
30th November 2013 and 24th December 2015), could be fruitfully analysed using 
the concept of the “Euro-national parliamentary system”. It is developing tradi-
tional and innovative parliamentary instruments, at national as well at Euro-
pean level (especially the so called “banking dialogue”), that these new powers 
can be made accountable and that the new bodies of the “fragmented” Execu-
tive in the EU, set up within the Banking Union, will not increase the width of the 
“democratic disconnect”. 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. - 2. The Euro-national parliamentary system: an analytical tool 
to clarify (and enhance) the role of Parliaments in the EU. - 3. The place of central banks in the 
“fragmented” Executive in the EU. - 4. The Banking Union: steps and architecture. - 5. The 
European Parliament’s role within the Banking Union governance. - 5.1. Towards a “banking 
dialogue”. The European Parliament’s oversight powers in Regulations 1024/2013 and 
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806/2014. - 5.2. The Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank. - 6. The National Parliaments’ participation in the Banking Union 
governance. - 6.1. An “anatomy” of the National Parliaments’ oversight powers in the Banking 
Union framework. - 6.2. The implementation of the National Parliaments’ internal rules: 
comparing procedural philosophies. - 7. Conclusions 
 
1. The setting up of the European Banking Union has been a strategic 
step of the European integration process1. By means of the Banking Union, fur-
ther traditional functions exercised at national level, also by the central banks2, 
have been pooled and will be mainly exercised at a European level. 
As often happens, especially regarding crucial policies on the banking 
sector, the most relevant roles have been assigned to bodies and institutions 
neither elected by citizens nor directly deriving their legitimacy from Parlia-
ments. Some powers are, indeed, reserved to the (National and European) Gov-
ernments, but most of them are attributed to central banks of the ESBC, inde-
pendent authorities and to other agencies that could be included in the “frag-
mented” Executive in the EU (as we will see in par. 3). 
For this very reason the problem of democratic oversight on the Euro-
pean Banking Union is, at the same time, absolutely crucial and not easy to be 
solved. Democratic legitimacy and political accountability of the important deci-
sions that can be taken by the institutions and bodies of the Banking Union and 
that might have clear and very relevant effects on European citizens, as savers, 
borrowers or taxpayers, depend on the capacity of Parliaments to exercise 
some form of oversight on these institutions. 
                                                                
1
For an historical antecedents of the Banking Union project, see MOURLON - DRUOL, 
Banking Union in Historical Perspective: The Initiative of the European Commission in the 
1960s–1970s, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, 1 ff. On the European policy 
framework in the financial sector and post‐crisis bank regulatory reforms, see CAPRIGLIONE – 
TROISI, L’ordinamento finanziario dell’UE dopo la crisi, Torino, Utet, 2014; ANGELONI –
BERETTI, Harmonising banking rules in the Single Supervisory Mechanism, in Law and 
Economics Yearly Review, 4, 2015, 124 ff.  
2
 On the problem of the separation between monetary policy and banking supervision, see, inter 
alia, GOODHART – SCHOENMAKER, Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking 
Supervision Be Separated?, in Oxford Economic Papers, 4, 1995, 539 ff.; SABBATELLI, La 
supervisione delle banche. Profili evolutivi, Padova, 2009, spec. 166 ff. 
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As always happens, the pooling of functions at European level deter-
mines a potential dispersion of responsibility, as well as the need to identify the 
Parliament where forms of accountability and sometimes of political direction 
could be experienced. It will be shown (respectively, in paras. 4 and 5) that both 
the European Parliament and National Parliaments are called upon to play a role 
in this regard. Indeed, after the Monetary Dialogue, the Political Dialogue and 
the Economic Dialogue a new framework of democratic oversight powers and 
parliamentary information rights was introduced within the Banking Union gov-
ernance. 
That is why, particularly in this case, the analytical tool of the Euro-na-
tional parliamentary system – a way of reading the role of the many Parliaments 
that exist and operate in the EU – could be useful in order to clarify the mecha-
nisms and the procedures allowing Parliaments to exercise one of their funda-
mental roles i.e. to oblige the Executives to publicly give account of the reasons 
for the decisions that they have taken and to discuss with representatives 
elected by the citizens the main directions they are going to follow while they 
make use of their powers.  
 
2. There are many ambiguities and debates on what is and what should 
be the place of the many Parliaments that exist and operate in the EU democ-
racy, and particularly on the respective functions of the European Parliament 
and National Parliaments3. These debates and ambiguities are particularly 
heated when they refer to functions that have been pooled following the inter-
governmental method instead of the community method, as in these cases the 
role of the European Parliament as co-legislator and its scrutiny powers of the 
Commission tend almost inevitably to be by-passed. At the same time, it is far 
from easy for National Parliaments to oversee the action exercised by the Ex-
                                                                
3
For an updated picture see HEFFTLER – NEUHOLD – ROZENBERG – SMITH (eds.), The 
Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015. 
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ecutives at European level: at best, each one of them can oversee and some-
times even direct the behavior of its own Government, with reference to how it 
was able to pursue the national interest, but obviously it is not in any position to 
do the same thing at European level, checking whether or not the policies en-
visaged or enacted have actually achieved the European interest.  
The analytical tool that has recently been proposed in this regard, in or-
der to better grasp these peculiar features of EU democracy, and eventually to 
stimulate their evolution, is the “Euro-national parliamentary system”4. It as-
sumes that the EU democracy is founded and characterized not only on the di-
rectly elected European Parliament, but also on the confidence relationships 
that, with the only exception of Cyprus, link each National Government to its 
Parliament (or with at least one Chamber thereof). Consequently, it tends to 
underline the relevance for EU democracy of the relationship between each Na-
tional Parliament and its respective Government, explicitly acknowledged by ar-
ticle 10 TEU, when it states, after recognizing that the EU is founded on repre-
sentative democracy and after recalling the role of the European Parliament, 
that “Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of 
State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves de-
mocratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citi-
zens”5.  
In comparison to other widespread analytical tools, like the one of the 
“multilevel parliamentary field”6, which has become remarkably widespread in 
                                                                
4
See MANZELLA – LUPO (eds.), Il sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale. Lezioni, Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2014; LUPO, Parlamento europeo e Parlamenti nazionali nella Costituzione 
“composita” dell’UE: le diverse letture possibili, in CIANCIO (ed.), Nuove strategie per lo 
sviluppo democratico e l’integrazione politica in Europa, Roma, Aracne, 2014, 365 ff.; 
MANZELLA, Parlamento europeo e parlamenti nazionali come sistema, in Rivista AIC, 1, 
2015, www.rivistaaic.it/parlamento-europeo-e-parlamenti-nazionali-come-sistema.html. 
5
On this point GRIGLIO – LUPO, Parliamentary Democracy and the Eurozone Crisis, in Law 
And Economics Yearly Review, 2012, 314. 
6
See CRUM – FOSSUM, The Multilevel Parliamentary Field: a framework for theorizing 
representative democracy in the EU, in European Political Science Review, 1, 2009, 249.  
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recent years7, the “Euronational Parliamentary system” seems more useful and 
meaningful, as it adds a couple of new and relevant elements. 
First, it includes in the picture not only all the Parliaments (European, Na-
tional and even regional, if they exercise legislative powers), but also the Execu-
tives. In this way, it highlights the fact that, also thanks to the already men-
tioned confidence relationships existing in each Member State’s form of gov-
ernment, among the main functions of each Parliament is the oversight of its 
Executive, or, better, of the part of the “fragmented” Executive in the EU that is 
in some way linked to it.  
Second, in talking about a “system” instead of a “field”, it shows that the 
relationships among Parliaments cannot be correctly defined as “having no clear 
relation of hierarchy, but linked to each other by a sense of common responsi-
bility, shared norms, and a certain density of interaction”. On the contrary, the 
relationships among Parliaments, and even more so those between each Par-
liament and its Executive, are designed and ruled by legal provisions and charac-
terized by Euro-national procedures and often by a number of common institu-
tions. 
In other words, the ‘system’ of relationships outlined above is consti-
tuted by procedures, ruled by a composite parliamentary law, made up of EU as 
well as national provisions, and is based on the idea that the functions of repre-
sentation, political direction and oversight are now necessarily shared between 
parliaments of different levels of government8. 
                                                                
7
Among others, LORD, The European Union: Parliamentary Wasteland or Parliamentary 
Field?, in CRUM – FOSSUM (eds.), Practices of Inter-parliamentary Coordination in 
International Politics: The European Union and Beyond, Colchester, ECPR Press, 2013, 235; 
ERIKSEN, The Normativity of the European Union, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, 98 ff.; 
ABELS – EPPLER (eds.), Subnational Parliaments in the EU Multi-Level Parliamentary 
System: Taking Stock of the Post-Lisbon Era, Innsbruck, Studien Verlag, 2015. 
8
See MANZELLA, Verso un governo parlamentare euro-nazionale? in MANZELLA –LUPO 
(eds.), No. 4 supra, 1 ff.. See also, although talking of a multilevel parliamentary field, 
WINZEN – ROEDERER-RYNNING – SCHIMMELFENNIG, Parliamentary Co-Evolution: 
National Parliamentary Reactions to the Empowerment of the European Parliament, in Journal 
of European Public Policy, 22, 2015, 75. 
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One of the advantages of this approach is that it should encourage Par-
liaments to cooperate not just for the pleasure of doing so, but because any 
form of interparliamentary cooperation would strengthen the setting up and 
the efficacy of parliamentary oversight on the “fragmented” Executive in the EU 
(the European Council, the Council, the Commission, and also the European 
Central Bank). 
 
3. As stated, there is no one single unitary institution in the EU which can 
be described as the “European government”. The executive power in the EU is 
indeed a “fragmented power”, that is composed of supranational institutions 
(the Commission, the ECB, the agencies), institutions made up of National Gov-
ernments (European Council, Council) and a galaxy of committees and working 
groups at a sectorial level9. 
However, far from weakening the EU Executive, its “fragmented” nature 
makes it “ultra-powerful”, as long as traditional forms of parliamentary over-
sight and political responsibility are difficult to apply10. In taking part in the 
European integration process, National Governments have obtained, at least in 
part, what was deemed impossible in contemporary democracy: the exercise of 
powers without (almost any) responsibility. 
On the one side this is the outcome of the fact that for the Government 
to blame someone else for the decisions they have actively concurred in taking 
and, on the other side, of the difficulty for National Parliaments and for (still 
mainly national) public opinion to correctly reconstruct the chain of political re-
                                                                
9For the thesis of the EU’s “fragmented executive”, see MAGNETTE, L’Union européenne: un 
regime semi-parlementaire, in DELWIT – DE WAELE – MAGNETTE (eds.), A quoi sert le 
Parlement européen?, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 1999, 25 ff.; CURTIN, Executive Power 
of the European Union. Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009, spec. p. 28 ff., Id. Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy, in 
The Modern Law Review, 1, 2014, 1 ff.  
10
See LUPO, Il controllo parlamentare dei Governi degli stati membri nell’Unione europea, tra 
trasparenza e privacy, in Federalismi, 3, 2015, 7. 
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sponsibility and, should it be necessary, to sanction those who have exercised 
their powers in an ineffective or incorrect manner11.  
Even the Banking Union governance is not exempt from the interactions 
between the “fragmented executive” in the EU and its parliamentary interface. 
Rather, the analysis of the supervision and resolution policies confirms that the 
ECB is not – as affirmed in a recent book12 – a counter-majoritarian institution 
that can be assimilated to a constitutional court. The ECB is instead a compo-
nent of the “fragmented executive”, and indeed this “executive” role explains 
the competences of the European Parliament and the National Parliaments to 
oversee the decisions adopted by the ECB within the Banking Union govern-
ance. 
The concept of “executive” shows at least two different meanings: in a 
negative sense, it could be defined as being in opposition with the other two 
powers which make up the traditional Montesquieu tripartite system; instead, 
in a positive sense it coincides with the bodies which carry out the function of 
execution13. 
From this point of view, the central banks seem to correspond with both 
definitions of “executive”. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the German 
Bundesbank is regulated by art. 88 GG., that is a provision included in the sec-
tion of the Basic Law concerning “The Execution of Federal Laws and the Federal 
Administration”14.  
                                                                
11
See HOBOLT – J. TILLEY, Blaming Europe? Responsibility Without Accountability in the 
European Union, OUP, Oxford, 2014.  
12
See MOROSINI, Banche centrali e questione democratica. Il caso della Banca centrale 
europea (BCE), Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2014, especially 43. 
13On the different meaning of “executive”, see BOGNETTI, Governo, in Enciclopedia delle 
scienze sociali, IV, 1994, 405 ff.; SCHÜTZE, European Constitutional Law
2
, Cambridge, CUP, 
2015, 302 ff. 
14
See BIFULCO, Bundesbank e Banche centrali dei Länder come modello del sistema europeo 
delle banche centrali, in GABRIELE (ed.), Il governo dell’economia tra crisi dello Stato e crisi 
del mercato, Bari, Cacucci, 2005, 41 ff. 
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Moreover, the recent ECB refinancing operations and purchase pro-
grammes15 highlight the “enlargement of functions” of the European Central 
Bank and could be considered as indirectly confirming the Alberto Predieri the-
sis: although the central banks are at the apex of a sectorial sub-system (the 
banking governance), they are actively involved in the political direction func-
tion, taking decisions with a general and intersectorial impact16. 
 
4. In December 2012, at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis17, the EU 
decision-makers launched a “road map” to achieve a complete Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) through the setting up of a European Banking Union18. 
The Banking Union architecture is built on three different pillars: the Sin-
gle Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and 
the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS)19. 
                                                                
15
On the ECB refinancing operations and purchase programmes, see MOSTACCI, Alla maniera 
di Asghar Farhadi. Le operazioni straordinarie della BCE nelle dinamiche delle separazione, in 
DPCE, l, 2015, 221 ff.; PISANESCHI, Legittimo secondo la Corte di Giustizia il piano di 
allentamento monetario (OMT) della BCE. Una decisione importante anche in relazione alla 
crisi greca, in Federalismi, 13, 2015; BASSAN, Le operazioni non convenzionali della BCE al 
vaglio della Corte costituzionale tedesca, in Riv. dir. internaz., 2014, 361 ff. 
16
See PREDIERI, Il potere della banca centrale: isola o modello?, Firenze, Passigli, 1996. 
17
For a parallel between the recent financial crisis and the Great Depression of 1929, see 
CAPRIGLIONE, Crisi a confronto (1929 e 2009), Padova, Cedam, 2009. 
18With regard to the “constitutional impact” of the crisis, on the EU as well as on national legal 
orders, see CONTIADES (eds.), Constitutions in the global financial crisis: a comparative 
analysis, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013; DI GASPARE, Diritto dell’economia e dinamiche 
istituzionali, Padova, 2015, 257 ff.; TUORI – TUORI, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional 
Analysis, Cambridge, CUP, 2014; BALAGUER CALLEJÓN, Crisis económica y crisis 
constitucional en Europa, in Revista española de derecho constitucional, 98, 2013, 91 ff.; 
CERRINA FERONI – FRANCO FERRARI (cur), Crisi economico-finanziaria e intervento 
dello Stato: modelli comparati e prospettive, Torino, Giappichelli, 2012; GRASSO, Il 
costituzionalismo della crisi. Uno studio sui limiti del potere e sulla sua legittimazione al tempo 
della globalizzazione, Napoli, Editoriale scientifica, 2012. Specifically on the impact on EU 
Constitution, denying that the responses to Eurocrisis determinined a “constitututional 
mutation” of the EU legal order, see (also for references to those who argued the opposite) DE 
WITTE, Euro Crisis Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased Institutional Variation or 
Constitutional Mutation?, in European Constitutional Law Review, 3, 11, 2015, 434 ff. With 
regard to the role of the ECB during the crisis, see NAPOLITANO, Il ruolo delle banche 
centrali nella gestione della crisi dell’Eurozona: osservazioni su alcuni aspetti istituzionali, in 
ADINOLFI – VELLANO (eds.), La crisi del debito sovrano degli stati dell’area Euro: profili 
giuridici, Torino, 203, 66 ff.; RAFFIOTTA, Il volto ambiguo della Banca centrale europea, in 
MORRONE (ed.), La costituzione finanziaria. La decisione di bilancio dello Stato 
costituzionale europeo, Torino, 2015, 215 ff. 
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Moving from the SSM, Regulation No. 1024/2013 established an inte-
grated and multilevel structure, transferring the direct supervision competences 
on the most systemically important banks to the ECB. The National supervising 
authority, instead, continues to carry out the supervision of “less significant 
banks”20, although under the ultimate responsibility of the ECB21. 
The ECB’s supervisory tasks are carried out by a Supervisory Board, which 
is composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, 4 representatives of the ECB and 
one representative from each national supervisory authority in the participating 
Member States. However, the ECB’s Governing Council has the power to reject 
the Supervisory Board’s decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
19
On the Banking Union project, see CAPRIGLIONE, L’Unione bancaria europea: una sfida 
per un’Europa più unita, Torino, Utet, 2013; BARUCCI – MESSORI (eds.), Towards the 
European Banking Union: achievements and open problems, Bagno a Ripoli, Passigli, 2014; 
CERRINA FERONI, Verso il Meccanismo Unico di Vigilanza sulle Banche. Ruolo e 
prospettive dell’European Banking Authority, in Federalismi, 17, 2014; PISANESCHI, La 
regolazione comunitaria del credito tra European Banking Authority (EBA) e Banca centrale 
europea: prime osservazioni sul Single Supervisory Mechanism, in MELICA – MEZZETTI –
PIERGIGLI (eds.), Studi in onore di G. De Vergottini, III, Padova, Cedam, 2014, 2283 ff.; 
BOCCUZZI, L’Unione bancaria europea. Nuove istituzioni e regole di vigilanza e di gestione 
delle crisi bancarie, Roma, Bancaria, 2015; BUSCH – FERRARINI, European Banking Union, 
Oxford, OUP, 2015; CLARICH, I poteri di vigilanza della Banca centrale europea, in Diritto 
pubblico, 3, 2013, 975 ff.; ANTONIAZZI, L’Unione bancaria europea: i nuovi compiti della 
BCE di vigilanza prudenziale degli enti creditizi e il meccanismo unico di risoluzione delle crisi 
bancarie, in Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, 3-4, 2014, 717 ff.; MANCINI, 
Dalla vigilanza nazionale armonizzata alla Banking Union, in Quaderni di ricerca giuridica – 
Banca d’Italia, 73, 2013, 10; CIRAOLO, Il Regolamento UE n. 1024/2013 sul Meccanismo 
unico di vigilanza e l’Unione bancaria europea. Prime riflessioni, in Amministrazioni in 
Cammino, 2014; QUAGLIA – HOWARTH, The New Intergovernmentalism in Financial 
Regulation and European Banking Union, in BICKERTON – HODSON – PUETTER (eds.), 
The New Intergovernmentalism States and Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era, 
Oxford, OUP, 2015, 146 ff.; DI MARCO, Il controllo delle banche nell’UEM: la 
(problematica) nascita di un sistema integrato di vigilanza prudenziale, in Dir. Un. eur., 3, 
2013, 549 ff.; TORCHIA, L’Unione bancaria europea: un approccio continentale?, in Giornale 
Dir. Amm., 2015, 1, 11 ff.; SCHIMMELFENNIG, A differentiated leap forward: spillover, 
pathdependency, and graded membership in European banking regulation, in West European 
Politics, 2016, 1 ff. For a comparison with the US experience, see KAISER, Act of Congress: 
How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t, Vintage, 2014. 
20
At present, the ECB directly supervises the 120 biggest banking groups, covering almost 85% 
of the total banking assets of the Euro area. In particular, banks subject to direct supervision are 
those which have assets of more than € 30 billion or which account for at least 20% of their 
home country’s GDP. 
21Indeed, the ECB may decide to directly supervise the “less significant” banks if necessary to 
ensure consistent application of the supervisory standards. 
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With the introduction of the SSM, the role of the European Banking Au-
thority (EBA) – within the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)22 – is 
undergoing some important changes. In any case, the EBA – an agency already 
established with Regulation No. 1093/2010 – maintains the responsibility for 
the implementation of the Single Rulebook in the banking sector23, participating 
moreover in the preparation of “bank stress tests”. 
Secondly, Regulation No. 806/2014 and Directive No. 59/2014 introduced 
the Single Resolution Mechanism, that is, an EU level system for the resolving of 
non-viable financial institutions. 
On the one hand, the Single Resolution Mechanism is based on a distri-
bution of tasks between an atypical European agency24 – the Single Resolution 
Board – and the National authorities. The Board is directly responsible for the 
cross-border cases and for the significant banks, while the National authorities 
ensure the resolution of the other cases. However, the resolution scheme 
adopted by the Board enters into force only if, within 24 hours after its adoption 
by the Board, there are no objections from the Council (acting by simple major-
ity) on a proposal by the Commission25. 
                                                                
22
The ESFS is a system of micro (the European Supervisory Authorities, the European Banking 
Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and macro-
prudential authorities (the European Systematic Risk Board) created in 2010. On the relations 
between EBA and Banking Union (and their constitutional implication) see CERRINA 
FERONI, Verso il Meccanismo Unico di Vigilanza sulle Banche. Ruolo e prospettive 
dell’European Banking Authority, in Federalismi, 17, 2014; PISANESCHI, Banca centrale 
europea, vigilanza bancaria e sovranità degli stati, in Federalismi, 17, 2014. 
23
 The Single Rulebook is a set of legal acts applied in all the EU which aims to harmonize the 
Member States’ legislations, ensuring the same level of protection for consumers and an equal 
playing field for the banks in Europe. In particular, it includes the capital requirements directive 
IV (CRD IV), the capital requirements regulation (CRR), the amended directive on deposit 
guarantee schemes, the bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD). 
24
 The Single Resolution Board is formally an EU agency with a composition and independence 
which departs from the model of all other EU agencies, which are auxiliary bodies and are 
subordinate to the Commission. See MACCHIA, The independence status of the Supervisory 
Board and of the Single Resolution Board: an expansive claim of autonomy?, in BARUCCI –
MESSORI (eds.), No. 19 supra 117 ff. 
25“Immediately after the adoption of the resolution scheme, the Board shall transmit it to the 
Commission. 
Within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Commission 
shall either endorse the resolution scheme, or object to it with regard to the discretionary aspects 
of the resolution scheme in the cases not covered in the third subparagraph of this paragraph. 
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On the other hand, the SRM finds a fundamental component in the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). This common fund, which is financed with the contribu-
tions of the same banks of the Banking Union participant countries, will be used 
for resolving the failing credit institutions. At the same time, a precondition for 
accessing the fund is the application of the “bail-in” system. Indeed, in order to 
minimize the costs of the resolution of a failing entity borne by the taxpayers, 
Directive No. 59/2014 introduces some rules to avoid the application of the 
“bail-out” model. Precisely, the “bail-in” principles ensure that shareholders and 
creditors of the failing entity suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate 
part of the costs arising from the failure of the entity. Only if necessary will it be 
possible to resort to the Single Resolution Fund. 
The SRF will be built up over a period of 8 years. However, in December 
2013, a Statement by the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers undertook to de-
velop a common “backstop” and ensure “bridge financing” for the transitional 
phase, also through the resources of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
It is important to emphasize the asymmetry between the European Sys-
tem of Financial Supervision – which is a decentralized, multi-layered system of 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Within 12 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Commission 
may propose to the Council: 
(a) to object to the resolution scheme on the ground that the resolution scheme adopted by the 
Board does not fulfill the criterion of public interest referred to in paragraph 1(c); 
(b) to approve or object to a material modification of the amount of the Fund provided for in the 
resolution scheme of the Board. 
The resolution scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the 
Council or by the Commission within a period of 24 hours after its transmission by the Board. 
The Council or the Commission, as the case may be, shall provide reasons for the exercise of 
their power of objection. 
Where, within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the 
Council has approved the proposal of the Commission for modification of the resolution scheme 
on the ground referred to in point (b) of the third subparagraph or the Commission has objected 
in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Board shall, within eight hours modify the 
resolution scheme in accordance with the reasons expressed. 
Where the resolution scheme adopted by the Board provides for the exclusion of certain 
liabilities in the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 27(5), and where such 
exclusion requires a contribution by the Fund or an alternative financing source, in order to 
protect the integrity of the internal market, the Commission may prohibit or require 
amendments to the proposed exclusion setting out adequate reasons based on an infringement of 
the requirements laid down in Article 27 and in the delegated act adopted by the Commission on 
the basis of Article 44(11) of Directive 2014/59/EU” (art. 18, par. 7 Regulation No. 806/2014). 
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micro- and macro-prudential authorities with a competence for the whole EU – 
and the SSM/SSR. Indeed, the SSM and SSR rules find application only in the Eu-
rozone and in those non-Euro countries that opt to join the Banking Union 
mechanisms. 
However, it is undoubtedly significant (although in no way surprising) 
that in the new Juncker Commission, the portfolio concerning the Banking Un-
ion was conferred to Lord Hill, that is, to a commissioner coming from a state, 
the United Kingdom, which does not participate in the Banking Union. 
Finally, Directive No. 49/2014 lays the foundation for the Deposit Guar-
antee Scheme. According to the Directive, Member States have to create a De-
posit Guarantee Scheme financed with the sector bank contributions. In this 
way, should deposits be unavailable, it will be possible to reimburse a limited 
amount of deposits to depositors whose bank has failed. 
 
5:5.1. The Euro-national parliamentary system research hypothesis finds 
a fundamental test in the recent trend towards the “parliamentarization” of the 
Banking Union governance26. Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 and 
Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council – de-
spite some “pitch invasion” of the intergovernmental method – reserved several 
original oversight powers for the European Parliament (EP) and the National 
Parliaments (NPs) in the field of policies related to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and banking resolution. Although these powers are rarely 
configured as definitive and insuperable, they can nonetheless represent an an-
                                                                
26The definition of the concept of “parliamentarization” is controversial. In any case, in this 
article, we will use this concept in a very broad meaning, that is to indicate the trend to 
empowerment of the parliamentary institutions within the European decision-making process: 
therefore including not only the European Parliament but also National Parliaments, Regional 
Parliaments and the instruments of interparliamentary cooperation, consistently with the 
approach of the Euro-national parliamentary system.  
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swer, regarding the banking policies pursued in the EU and in the Eurozone, to 
accountability and “democratic disconnect” problems27.  
Undoubtedly, these new forms of accountability do not substitute the 
tools which the European Parliament can exploit within the Monetary Dialogue 
and the Economic Dialogue. Pursuant to the first tool, the ECB shall address 
some periodical reports to the EP, which may adopt recommendations on the 
monetary policy of the ECB28. With regard to the Economic Dialogue, starting 
from the “Six-Pack” and “Two-Pack”, some continuous interaction procedures 
have been introduced between the EP, Council, Commission, European Council 
and national institutions within the European semester29.  
                                                                
27
According to LINDSETH, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State, 
Oxford, OUP, 2010, the problem in Europe is not the “democratic deficit”, in the sense of 
needing increased input legitimacy, but rather a “democratic disconnect”. Indeed, the EU 
institutions are generally perceived as beyond the oversight of the national democratic and 
constitutional bodies, and this has a bearing on the scope of authority that Europeans believe 
supranational bodies can legitimately exercise. For the “subsidiarity deficit” thesis, see 
MACCORMICK, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State, and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth, Oxford, OUP, 1999. For overview on the debate about the democratic deficit, 
see also RIDOLA, The parliamentarisation of the institutional architecture of the European 
Union between representative democracy and participatory democracy, in BLANKE –
MANGIAMELI (eds.), Governing Europe under a Constitution, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, 
2006, 415 ff.; CRAIG, Integration, democracy and legitimacy, in CRAIG – DE BURCA (eds.), 
The evolution of EU Law
2
, Oxford, OUP, 2011, 13 ff. 
28
On the Monetary Dialogue, see AMTENBRINK – VAN DUIN, The European Central Bank 
before the European Parliament: theory and practice after 10 years of monetary dialogue, in 
European Law Review, 2009, 561 ff.; EIJFFINGER – MUJAGIC, An Assessment of the 
Effectiveness of the Monetary Dialogue on the ECB’s Accountability and Transparency: A 
Qualitative Approach, in Intereconomics, 2004, 190 ff.; COLLIGNON, Central Bank 
Accountability in Times of Crisis. The Monetary Dialogue: 2009-2014, 2014, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu. For the problem on the ECB democratic accountability, see 
AMTENBRINK, On the Legitimacy and Democratic Accountability of the European Central 
Bank, in ARNULL – WINCOTT (eds.), Accountability and Legittimacy in the European Union: 
Legal Arrangements and practical experience, Oxford, OUP, 2002, 147 ff.; AMTENBRINK, 
The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks. A comparative study of the European Central 
Bank, Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999; GORMLEY – DE HAAN, The Democratic Deficit of the 
European Central Bank, in E.L. Review, 1996, 95 ff. 
29On the ambiguity of the “Economic Dialogue” concept, FASONE, European Economic 
Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament?, in 
European Law Journal, 2, 2014, 164 ff., highlighting that “it is not clear what happens if the 
Economic Dialogue fails or if one of the institution does not fulfill its obligations. In many 
regards, its execution seems to be left to the voluntary commitment of the European Parliament, 
the Commission, the Council, the President of the European Council and the governments of the 
Member States”. On the European Semester, see ARMSTRONG, The New Governance of EU 
Fiscal Discipline, in European Law Review, 5, 2013 601 ff. 
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To a certain extent, on the contrary, the parliamentary oversight powers 
established in the Banking Union framework seem to represent the partial re-
production and enhancement of the format already experimented with the 
Monetary Dialogue and the Economic Dialogue. 
In spite of a trend of literature to highlight the critical points rather than 
the merits of the Monetary Dialogue30, some eminent scholars, in a “qualita-
tive” evaluation of the relationship between the European Parliament and the 
ECB, underlined how the Monetary Dialogue has increased the transparency 
and the accountability of the ECB over time31. 
This element appears encouraging in view of the next steps of the BU. 
However, in this article any conclusion about the effectiveness of the oversight 
powers of the European Parliament and National Parliaments within the Bank-
ing Union governance will have only an open and provisional character. The pe-
riod that has elapsed from the assumption of the prudential supervision compe-
tence by the ECB on 4 November 2014 is indeed too short. Moreover, as whole 
parts of the Banking Union project are incomplete or not fully implemented, in 
this phase the research can only take into consideration the fundamental data 
of the institutional practice in a minimum part. 
As seen above, Regulations No. 1024/2013 and No. 806/2014 have 
transferred some relevant competences from national to EU level in the field of 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and banking 
resolutions. 
                                                                
30According to the article 284, par. 3 TFEU “The European Central Bank shall address an 
annual report on the activities of the ESCB and on the monetary policy of both the previous and 
current year to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and also to the 
European Council. The President of the European Central Bank shall present this report to the 
Council and to the European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on that basis. The 
President of the European Central Bank and the other members of the Executive Board may, at 
the request of the European Parliament or on their own initiative, be heard by the competent 
committees of the European Parliament”. Although the art. 284, par. 3 TFEU requires only one 
meeting a year, the Monetary Dialogue takes place quarterly in the form of a meeting between 
the President of the ECB and the ECON Committee. 
31
 See AMTENBRINK – VAN DUIN, No. 28 supra, which however highlighted some 
criticality of the Monetary Dialogue. 
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However, the EU has tried to balance this process of power transfer 
through the strength of the transparency and democratic accountability stan-
dards within the context of the supervision and resolution policies in the Euro-
zone.  
In this framework, the ECB “shall be accountable to the European Parlia-
ment and to the Council for the implementation” of Regulation No. 1024/2013 
(art. 20, par. 1), while the Single Resolution Board “shall be accountable to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission” for the implementation 
of Regulation No. 806/2014 (art. 45, par. 1). 
Therefore, the conferral of supervisory and resolution tasks from the 
Member States to the Union level in the field of the Banking Union is balanced 
by the promotion of the European Parliament oversight function, through the 
introduction of specific transparency and accountability standards. On the other 
hand, these new forms of accountability are not exempt from an “original inter-
governmental flaw”32. 
First of all, the Regulation which transferred the prudential supervisory 
tasks to the ECB was adopted, in accordance with art. 127, par. 6 TFEU, follow-
ing a special legislative procedure, within which the European Parliament was 
only consulted. This means that, without a more solid legal “umbrella”, the 
Council could at any time make a clean sweep of the European Parliament and 
National Parliaments oversight powers within SSM governance (or, however, 
reshape these powers in a unilateral way). The fact that, in the current Euro-
pean political framework, this scenario appears unlikely does not change how 
things really stand, at least from a legal perspective.  
Another sign of the “intergovernmental original flaw” can be traced back 
to the status of the “Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contribu-
                                                                
32On the “vizio d’origine “intergovernativo” (“original intergovernmental flaw”) of the new 
forms of accountability within the Banking Union, see IBRIDO – PECORARIO, Unione 
bancaria e sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale, in DPCE, 1, 2016, forthcoming. 
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tions to the SRF”. Despite an initial outcry from the European Parliament33, 
Regulation No. 806/2014, adopted in accordance with an ordinary legislative 
procedure ex art. 114 TFEU, transferred an essential part of the matter to an in-
tergovernmental agreement (and therefore an international legal source), 
causing many protests by the European Parliament given that art. 114 TFEU, for 
the unanimous admission of the legal services of the three main institutions, 
constituted the most appropriate legal basis. 
 
5.2 In any case, the European Parliament’s oversight powers within the 
Single Supervision Mechanism are only partially defined by Regulation (EU) No. 
1024/2013. Indeed, art. 20, par. 9 refers to an Interinstitutional Agreement be-
tween the European Parliament and the ECB for the concrete definition of the 
“practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and scrutiny 
over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation”34. 
In a similar manner, art. 45, par. 7 and 8 of Regulation No. 806/2014 es-
tablished that the European Parliament and Single Resolution Board would set 
out an Agreement to define the European Parliament oversight powers of the 
activity of the Board. 
The Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and 
ECB was published on 30 November 2013 in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. Instead, the European Parliament and Single Resolution Board concluded 
the second Agreement on 16 December 2015. 
                                                                
33
 See the letter of 20 January 2014 from the European Parliament President to the President of 
the Commission on the Single Resolution Fund, in which Martin Schulz stood against the 
decision of the Council to take certain aspects out of Regulation No. 806/2014 and dealt with 
them through an intergovernmental procedure. With regard to the problem of the legal basis of 
the Single Supervision Mechanism, see TOSATO, The legal basis of the Banking Union, in 
BARUCCI – MESSORI (eds.), Towards the European Banking Union: achievements and open 
problems, No. 19 supra, 43 ff. 
34
Moreover, in December 2013 the Council of the European Union and the European Central 
bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the cooperation related to the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. The Memorandum implemented the accountability and reporting 
obligation of the ECB to the Council and the Euro Group under Regulation (EU) No. 
1024/2013. 
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The Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and 
ECB can be divided into 4 parts. 
First of all, the Agreement defined some specific oversight procedures: a) 
the presentation of an Annual Report of the ECB at a public hearing of Parlia-
ment. The Report concerns the execution of supervisory tasks within the SSM35; 
b) the power of the ECON Committee of the European Parliament to convene 
the Chairman of the Supervisory Board for ordinary hearings, ad hoc exchanges 
of views and confidential meetings36; c) the duty of the ECB to reply in writing to 
                                                                
35“The ECB shall submit every year a report to Parliament (“Annual Report”) on the execution 
of the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. The Chair of the Supervisory 
Board shall present the Annual Report to Parliament at a public hearing. The draft Annual 
Report shall be made available to Parliament on a confidential basis in one of the Union official 
languages four working days in advance of the hearing (…) During the start-up phase referred 
to in Article 33(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the ECB shall transmit to Parliament 
quarterly reports on progress in the operational implementation of the Regulation (…) The ECB 
shall publish the Annual Report on the SSM website. The ECB’s “information e-mail hotline” 
will be extended to deal specifically with SSM-related questions, and the ECB shall convert the 
feedback received via e-mails into a FAQ section on the SSM website” (art. I.1 of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB). 
36“The Chair of the Supervisory Board shall participate in ordinary public hearings on the 
execution of the supervisory tasks on request of Parliament’s competent committee. 
Parliament’s competent committee and the ECB shall agree on a calendar for two such hearings 
to be held in the course of the following year. Requests for changes to the agreed calendar shall 
be made in writing. 
–In addition, the Chair of the Supervisory Board may be invited to additional ad hoc exchanges 
of views on supervisory issues with Parliament’s competent committee. 
– Where necessary for the exercise of Parliament’s powers under the TFEU and Union law, the 
Chair of its competent committee may request special confidential meetings with the Chair of 
the Supervisory Board in writing, giving reasons. Such meetings shall be held on a mutually 
agreed date. 
–All participants in the special confidential meetings shall be subject to confidentiality 
requirements equivalent to those applying to the members of the Supervisory Board and to the 
ECB’s supervisory staff. 
– On a reasoned request by the Chair of the Supervisory Board or the Chair of Parliament’s 
competent committee, and with mutual agreement, the ordinary hearings, the ad hoc exchanges 
of views and the confidential meetings can be attended by the ECB representatives in the 
Supervisory Board or senior members of the supervisory staff (Director Generals or their 
Deputies). 
–The principle of openness of Union institutions in accordance with the TFEU shall apply to the 
SSM. The discussion in special confidential meetings shall follow the principle of openness and 
elaboration around the relevant circumstances. It involves the exchange of confidential 
information regarding the execution of the supervisory tasks, within the limit set by Union law. 
The disclosure might be restricted by confidentiality limits legally foreseen. 
–Persons employed by Parliament and by the ECB may not disclose information acquired in the 
course of their activities related to the tasks conferred on the ECB under Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013, even after such activities have ended or they have left such employment. 
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written questions put to it by the European Parliament as promptly as possible, 
and in any event within five weeks of their transmission to the ECB37; d) the 
possibility for the European Parliament to access some categories of informa-
tion in possession of the ECB38. 
Secondly, in the attempt to strengthen the standard of transparency in 
the selection process of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board, the interinstitutional agreement of 30 November 2013 submitted their 
appointment to Parliament’s approval, which is held at a public hearing of the 
candidates proposed by the ECB. If the proposal for the Chair is not approved, 
the ECB may decide either to draw on the pool of candidates that originally ap-
plied for the position or to re-initiate the selection process. From this point of 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
–The ordinary hearings, ad hoc exchanges of views and the confidential meetings can cover all 
aspects of the activity and functioning of the SSM covered by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
–No minutes or any other recording of the confidential meetings shall be taken. No statement 
shall be made for the press or any other media. Each participant to the confidential discussions 
shall sign every time a solemn declaration not to divulge the content of those discussions to any 
third person. 
– Only the Chair of the Supervisory Board and the Chair and the Vice-Chairs of Parliament’s 
competent committee may attend the confidential meetings. Both the Chair of the Supervisory 
Board and the Chair and the Vice-Chairs of Parliament’s competent committee may be 
accompanied by two members of respectively ECB staff and of Parliament’s Secretariat” (art. 
I.2 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB). 
37“The ECB shall reply in writing to written questions put to it by Parliament. Those questions 
shall be channeled to the Chair of the Supervisory Board via the Chair of Parliament’s 
competent committee. Questions shall be replied as promptly as possible, and in any event 
within five weeks of their transmission to the ECB. 
– Both the ECB and Parliament shall dedicate a specific section of the websites for the 
questions and answers referred to above” (art. I.3 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between 
the European Parliament and the ECB). 
38“– The ECB shall provide Parliament’s competent committee at least with a comprehensive 
and meaningful record of the proceedings of the Supervisory Board that enables an 
understanding of the discussions, including an annotated list of decisions. In the case of an 
objection of the Governing Council against a draft decision of the Supervisory Board in 
accordance with Article 26(8) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the President of the ECB shall 
inform the Chair of Parliament’s competent committee of the reasons for such an objection, in 
line with the confidentiality requirements referred to in this Agreement. 
– In the event of the winding-up of a credit institution, non-confidential information relating to 
that credit institution shall be disclosed ex post, once any restrictions on the provision of 
relevant information resulting from confidentiality requirements have ceased to apply. 
– The supervisory fees and an explanation of how they are calculated shall be published on ECB 
website. 
– The ECB shall publish on its website a guide to its supervisory practices” (art. I.4 of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB). 
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view, these provisions present some analogies with the appointment procedure 
of the European Banking Authority Chairperson39. 
The European Parliament can use this sort of veto power also in relation 
to the ECB’s proposal to remove the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board from their office40. 
Moreover, in the case that the European Parliament sets up a Committee 
of Inquiry41, the ECB, in accordance with Union law, shall assist a Committee of 
Inquiry in carrying out its tasks in accordance with the principle of sincere coop-
eration. Against this support, the European Parliament shall respect some con-
fidentiality obligations42. 
                                                                
39
According to the art. 48 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, the European Banking Authority Chairperson shall be appointed by the EBA Board 
of Supervisors, following an open selection procedure. However, before taking up his duties, 
and up to 1 month after the selection, the European Parliament may, after having heard the 
candidate selected by the Board of Supervisors, object to the designation of the selected person. 
40“– The approval process shall comprise the following steps: 
– The ECB shall convey its proposals for the Chair and the Vice-Chair to Parliament together 
with written explanations of the underlying reasons. 
– A public hearing of the proposed Chair and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board shall be held 
in Parliament’s competent committee. 
– Parliament shall decide on the approval of the candidate proposed by the ECB for Chair and 
Vice-Chair through a vote in the competent committee and in plenary. Parliament will normally, 
taking into account its calendar, aim at taking that decision within six weeks of the proposal. 
– If the proposal for the Chair is not approved, the ECB may decide either to draw on the pool 
of candidates that applied originally for the position or to re-initiate the selection process, 
including elaborating and publishing a new vacancy notice. 
– The ECB shall submit any proposal to remove the Chair or the Vice-Chair from office to 
Parliament and provide explanations. 
– The approval process shall comprise: 
– a vote in Parliament’s competent committee on a draft resolution; and 
– a vote in plenary, for approval or objection, on that resolution”. (art. II of the Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB). 
41
The main legal basis of the Committee of Inquiry is the art. 226 TFEU. According to this 
provision, the European Parliament may – at the request of a quarter of its members – set up a 
temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in 
the implementation of Union law. More detailed provisions about the European Parliament’s 
right of inquiry are contained in the Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 19 April 1995. 
42
 All recipients of information provided to European Parliament in the context of investigations 
shall be subject to confidentiality requirements equivalent to those applying to the members of 
the Supervisory Board and to the ECB supervisory staff and Parliament and the ECB shall agree 
on the measures to be applied to ensure the protection of such information. Moreover, where the 
protection of a public or private interest recognised in Decision 2004/258/EC requires that 
confidentiality is maintained, European Parliament shall ensure that this protection is 
maintained and shall not divulge the content of any such information 
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Finally, according to the interinstitutional agreement, the ECB shall pre-
emptively inform the ECON Committee with regard to the main contents of 
some categories of acts which the ECB drafts to adopt within the SSM43. This 
obligation is established also with reference to the Code of Conduct referred to 
in art. 19 of Regulation No. 1024/201344. 
The European Parliament oversight powers defined by Regulation No. 
806/2014 mirror, in great part, the powers established by Regulation No. 
1024/2013 and by the Interinstitutional agreement of November 2013. Indeed, 
the Chairman of the Single Resolution Board shall submit an Annual report to 
the European Parliament, to participate at the public hearing of the ECON 
Committee (at least once a year), to hold confidential discussions behind closed 
doors with the Chairman and Vice- Chairman of the ECON Committee.  
Moreover, the Single Resolution Board shall reply orally or in writing to 
questions addressed to it by the European Parliament within five weeks and 
shall support the European Parliament investigation45.  
Finally, the European Parliament confirms the appointment46 and the re-
moval47 of the Chair, Vice-Chair and four other full-time members of the Single 
Resolution Board. 
                                                                
43“– The ECB shall duly inform Parliament’s competent committee of the procedures (including 
timing) it has set up for adoption of ECB regulations, decisions, guidelines and 
recommendations (“acts”), which are subject to public consultation in accordance with 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
–The ECB shall, in particular, inform Parliament’s competent committee of the principles and 
kinds of indicators or information it is generally using in developing acts and policy 
recommendations, with a view to enhancing transparency and policy consistency. 
–The ECB shall transmit to Parliament’s competent committee the draft acts before the 
beginning of the public consultation procedure. Where Parliament submits comments on the 
acts, there may be informal exchanges of views with the ECB on such comments. Such informal 
exchanges of views shall take place in parallel with the open public consultations which the 
ECB shall conduct in accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
– Once the ECB has adopted an act, it shall send it to Parliament’s competent committee. The 
ECB shall also regularly inform Parliament in writing about the need to update adopted acts”. 
(art. V of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB). 
44
The Code of Conduct is a set of rules which establish proper practices for the ECB staff and 
management involved in banking supervision concerning in particular conflicts of interest. 
45
According to the art. 128 of the European Parliament Rules of Procedure, questions for oral 
answer with debate may be put to the Council or the Commission by a committee, a political 
group or at least 40 Members. 
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As seen in this overview, the European Parliament’s oversight powers 
within the Banking Union appear variegated and heterogeneous: some of these 
can in fact be attributed to a passive function, like for instance, the right of the 
ECON Committee to receive a report of the Supervisory Board’s meetings. In 
other cases, these powers have a more active nature, in which the European 
Parliament is called upon to give its own views. Sometimes, this active role can 
include powers of a positive type, such as, in particular, the comments that the 
European Parliament can transmit to the ECB regarding the drafting of acts. 
Otherwise, the European Parliament’s active oversight function can include 
powers of a negative type. This is the case of the opposition power to the ap-
pointment of the Chairman of the Supervisory Committee. 
The “fil rouge” of this cluster of powers can instead be traced back to the 
tension between the demands of publicity – which represents the traditional 
reason for the oversight function – and the necessity to preserve the confiden-
tiality of the work of the ECB and the Single Resolution Board. This is a very im-
portant point, given that a surplus of publicity can compromise the efficacy of 
the supervisory and resolution action, proper market behavior and the very ca-
pacity of the European Parliament to obtain information48. 
From this point of view, the special regime of publicity established by the 
“confidential meetings” (art. I.2) is emblematic. These meetings may be at-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
46
The Single Resolution Board shall be composed of the Chair, four other full-time members 
and a member appointed by each participating Member State (representing their national 
resolution authorities). The Chair, the Vice-Chair and the four full-time members shall be 
chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure. In particular, the Commission shall submit a 
proposal for the appointment of the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the full-time to the European 
Parliament for approval. Following the approval of that proposal, the Council, acting by 
qualified majority, shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint these members. 
47
If the Chair or the Vice-Chair or a full-time member no longer fulfills the conditions required 
for the performance of his or her duties or has been guilty of serious misconduct, the Council, 
acting by qualified majority, and on a proposal from the Commission which has been approved 
by the European Parliament, may adopt an implementing decision to remove him or her from 
office. 
48On the need to control the publicity of parliamentary committees’ activity, especially after the 
transformations due to the internet, see FASONE - LUPO, Transparency vs. Informality in 
Legislative Committees. Comparing the US House of Representatives, the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies and the European Parliament, in The Journal of Legislative Studies, 3, 2015, 342 ff. 
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tended only by the President of the Supervisory Board, the Chairman and Vice-
Chairman of the ECON Committee and two senior members of the ECB staff and 
the Parliament’s Secretariat. No minutes of the proceedings or any other re-
cording of the confidential meetings shall be taken. No statement shall be made 
to the press or any other media. Moreover, each participant at the confidential 
discussions shall sign a solemn declaration every time not to divulge the content 
of those discussions to any third person. 
The binding nature and the “enforcement” of the interinstitutional 
agreement (and, even more so, of other typologies of agreements) in the 
framework of EU source of law are debatable49. In principle, the interinstitu-
tional agreements are a species of the wider typology of atypical acts (that is, 
acts not provided for by art. 288 TFEU). However, the difficulties to define the 
position of these acts are increased by the fact that some of these agreements 
find a legal basis in the Treaties, while others may be deemed at the most only 
the expression of the principle of “mutual sincere cooperation” (art. 13, par. 2 
TEU). 
The two agreements that the European Parliament had to conclude 
within the Banking Union do not find the “umbrella” of art. 295 TFEU, which al-
lows Council, Commission and European Parliament to adopt binding interinsti-
tutional agreements. Therefore the legal basis of these agreements can be 
traced back only to the Regulations concerning the SSM and SRM (nevertheless 
with the additional “umbrella” of the already mentioned art. 13, par. 2 TEU). 
 
6:6.1. Although less incisive in comparison with the tools of the European 
Parliament, the oversight powers that art. 21 of Regulation No. 1024/2013 and 
                                                                
49
See HUMMER, From “Interinstitutional Agreements” to Interinstitutional Agencies/Offices? 
in European Law Journal, 1, 2007, 47 ff.; TOURNEPICHE, Les accords intérinstitutionnels 
dans l’Union européenne, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011; SBOLCI, Conflitti tra istituzioni 
dell’Unione europea e accordi interistituzionali, in Riv. dir. internaz., 2, 2007, 344 ff.; 
STACEY, Integrating Europe. Informal politics & institutional Change, Oxford, 2010; 
FIENGO, Brevi riflessioni in tema di natura giuridica ed efficacia degli accordi 
interistituzionali alla luce del Trattato di Nizza, in DPCE, 1, 2002, 13 ff. 
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art. 46 of Regulation No. 806/2014 reserved for the National Parliaments also 
appear relevant. Rather, according to some scholars the National Parliaments’ 
participation in the Banking Union governance exceeds the oversight function 
usually played by these bodies towards the National Central Banks50. 
First of all, like the European Parliament, the National Parliaments also 
receive the annual reports from the ECB and the Single Resolution Board. In 
turn, the National Parliaments can “react” to them, addressing their reasoned 
observations on the reports to the ECB and Single Resolution Board. 
Secondly, through their own procedures the National Parliaments may 
request the ECB and Resolution Board to reply in writing to any observations or 
questions submitted by them.  
Finally, the National Parliaments may invite the Chairman or a member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Chairman of Resolution Board to participate in an 
exchange of views together with a representative of the competent national au-
thority. However, the terminology used by the Regulations is ambiguous: the 
reference to “exchange of views” rather than “hearings” – a tool which instead 
could be activated by the European Parliament and Euro Group – could be in-
terpreted as the exclusion from the possibility to organize meetings with the 
same level of formality and publicity typical of the hearings in the National Par-
liaments’ Rules of Procedure. 
It is important to emphasize that the involvement of the National Parlia-
ments is also the result of the contribution of these institutions within the po-
litical dialogue procedure. Some National Parliaments – this is the case, for ex-
ample, of the Czech Republic and Denmark51 – asked for an empowerment of 
                                                                
50
See MANZELLA, Parlamento europei e Parlamenti nazionali come sistema, No. 4 supra, at 
10.  
51
On 13 March 2013, a Resolution of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 
observed that the “new tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
supervision of banks leads to a significant concentration of power in the hands of one institution 
(…). It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that the ECB is, in the exercise of this function, subject 
to democratic control, not only by the European Parliament, but also, in particular (…) National 
Parliaments, because the responsibility for the stability of the financial system (including 
financial guarantees to depositors) will continue to lie with the Member States”. Instead, on 10 
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the role of the National Parliaments within the Banking Union governance in the 
comments transmitted to the Commission52. 
Obviously, the catalogue of National Parliaments powers within the 
Banking Union should be interpreted also in the light of the oversight tools that 
each Chamber can activate on its own Government by virtue of the domestic 
constitutional law. As has been seen, indeed, the ECB and the SRB are account-
able also to the Council. Consequently, according to the “Europeanization 
clause” of the national institutional framework contained in art. 10, par. 2 TEU, 
Member States are represented in the Council by their governments, them-
selves democratically accountable either to their National Parliaments, or to 
their citizens. 
As clarified by the preamble of the two above mentioned Regulations, 
the involvement of the National Parliaments is aimed to counterbalance the po-
tential impact that Banking Union measures may have on public finances, credit 
institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participat-
ing Member States. 
However, this catalogue did not confer oversight powers to all National 
Parliaments, but only to the Chambers of the Eurozone and also the Parliaments 
of the countries, not included in the Eurozone but which have established a 
close cooperation in the Banking Union field (the so-called, “‘participating 
Member States”). This element introduces a relevant component of differentia-
tion in comparison with the European Parliament: while the involvement of the 
National Parliaments in this field reflects the “variable geometries” of the 
“asymmetric Union”, the European Parliament composition instead expresses 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
July 2013 the European Affairs Committee of the Danish Parliament presented an Opinion 
concerning the EU Commission proposal for a Regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
The majority was pleased that the proposal ensured that the Single Resolution Board must 
inform National Parliaments of its activities and answer questions submitted by the Parliaments. 
In this framework, the majority support the view that National Parliaments should be able to 
invite the Executive Director of the Single Resolution Board to participate in an exchange of 
views. 
52On the “political dialogue”, see, ex multis, D. JANCIC, The Barroso Initiative: Window 
Dressing or Democracy Boost?, in Utrecht Law Review, 2012, 78 ff. 
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the traditional indifference of this institution to the “differentiated integration” 
models53.  
According to one of the possible classification criteria54 we can distin-
guish among four kinds of National Parliaments “European powers”: a) powers 
individually attributed to each Chamber; b) powers attributed to each National 
Parliament, thus requiring a double approval in the case of bicameral systems; 
c) powers attributed to a “group of chambers”, which require the achievement 
of some threshold; d) powers exercised in collective form, in the case with the 
involvement of the European Parliament.  
Therefore, the National Parliaments’ powers within Banking Union gov-
ernance can be classified in the first category. At the most, in some countries 
like Spain, where a bicameral Committee for the EU is provided, the National 
Parliaments can consider the possibility to exercise powers of the second type. 
The question of the “individual” or “collective” nature of the National 
Parliaments’ oversight powers makes it possible to deal with a fundamental 
point. According to some scholars, the National Parliaments’ individual action 
integrates an indirect source of democratic legitimacy (affecting the domestic 
level in a way not so dissimilar to the “pluralist paradigm” identified by the 
Maastricht-Urteil). On the contrary, the National Parliaments’ collective action 
would ensure a quantum of legitimacy which is not mediated by the democratic 
resources of the Member States55. 
This interpretation, which may be too schematic, needs to be problema-
tized. The border line between the “individual action” and “collective action” of 
the National Parliaments is indeed much more uncertain than may appear at 
                                                                
53
See FASONE, Il Parlamento europeo nell’Unione asimmetrica, in MANZELLA – LUPO 
(eds.), No. 4 supra at 51 ff.  
54
See LUPO, National parliaments in the European integration process: re-aligning politics 
and policies, in CARTABIA – LUPO – SIMONCINI (edt.), Democracy and subsidiarity in the 
EU National Parliaments, regional and civil society in the decision-making process, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 2013, 107 ff.  
55
See KNUTELSKÁ, Cooperation among National Parliaments: An Effective Contribution to 
EU Legitimation? in CRUM – FOSSUM (edt.), Practices of Inter-parliamentary Coordination 
in International Politics: The European Union and Beyond, Essex, ECPR Press, 2013, 35 ff.  
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first sight. For example, how to frame these interparliamentary cooperation 
forms which aim to put the Parliaments in the best conditions for the activation 
of the European procedures on an individual basis56? 
In fact, the chances of success of the new democratic accountability 
mechanisms largely depends on the predisposition of adequate interparliamen-
tary cooperation forms – not expressly provided for by Regulations No. 
1024/2013 and 806/2014. Without a doubt, the point is not to add a new and 
further body specialized on the Banking Union affairs to the already over-
crowded family of interparliamentary cooperation bodies. The point is instead 
to exploit the already existing cooperation structures or however to activate 
fast informal cooperation channels among Parliaments. It suffices to imagine, 
for example, the opportunity to organize ad hoc meetings between the Euro-
pean Parliament ECON Committee and the National Parliaments’ specialized 
Committees. From this point of view, the interparliamentary cooperation in the 
Banking Union field has at least three important advantages. 
First of all, the exchange of information and good practice would make it 
possible to take care of the problem of the “informational asymmetry” which 
has been identified by eminent scholars as one of the main factors at the basis 
of the “executive dominance issue”57. 
Secondly, the cooperation in the Banking Union field could help to 
strengthen the connection and the complementarity among the European Par-
                                                                
56
 On interparliamentary cooperation, see CRUM – FOSSUM (eds.), Practices of 
Interparliamentary Coordination in International Politics. The European Union and Beyond, 
Essex, ECPR Press, 2013; COOPER, Parliamentary oversight of the EU after the crisis: on the 
creation of the “article 13” interparliamentary conference, SOG Working Paper Series, 2014; 
DECARO – LUPO (eds.), Il “dialogo” tra Parlamenti: obiettivi e risultati, Roma, Luiss 
University Press, 2009; ESPOSITO, La cooperazione interparlamentare: principi, strumenti e 
prospettive, in MANZELLA – LUPO (eds.), Il sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale. Lezioni, 
No. 4 supra, 133 ff.; DICOSOLA, I Presidenti di Assemblea nella cooperazione 
interparlamentare in Europa, in GIANFRANCESCO – LUPO – RIVOSECCHI (eds.), I 
Presidenti di Assemblea parlamentare. Riflessioni su un ruolo in trasformazione, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 2014, 331 ff.  
57
 See CURTIN, Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy, in The Modern 
Law Review, 1, 2014, 1 ff. and notably 15. 
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liament and National Parliaments, reversing the trend of these institutions to 
interpret their relationships in competitive terms58.  
Finally, a third advantage consists in the contribution which the interpar-
liamentary cooperation can offer the National Parliaments’ “Europeanization”59. 
In this framework, the cooperation appears able to increase the National Par-
liaments’ awareness to work, also in this sector, within a systemic and intercon-
nected European dimension, fostering a fruitful process of global interaction 
among National Parliaments’ Rules of Procedures. In this way, the parliamen-
tary oversight procedures in the Banking Union field can be “exchanged”, de-
veloped, improved and integrated in their own national context. 
 
6.2 As mentioned above, the setting up of new oversight powers needs 
an implementation of the National Parliaments’ internal procedures. Regarding 
the power to address the observations to the ECB and the Board, the same 
Regulations No. 1024/2013 and 806/2014 require an upgrade of the National 
Parliaments’ Rules of Procedure. 
The main choice that National Parliaments are called upon to make will 
be that of defining the relations between the competent Committee for the 
banking sector and the Committee on European affairs. From this point of view, 
the German Bundestag experience and that of the French National Assembly 
seem to point to the existence of two opposing philosophies60.  
The German Bundestag – which significantly was the first Parliament to 
set up new oversight mechanisms introduced with Regulation No. 1024 of 2013 
                                                                
58
See  FASONE – LUPO, Conclusion. Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Framework of a 
Euro-National Parliamentary System, in FASONE – LUPO (eds.), Interparliamentary 
cooperation in the composite European Constitution, Hart, Forthcoming. 
59On the concept of “Europeanization” see RADAELLI – EXADAKTYLOS, New Directions in 
the Europeanization Research, in EGAN – NUGENT – PATTERSON (eds.), Research Agendas 
in EU Studies. Stalking the Elephant, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 189 ff.; 
FABBRINI (ed.), L’europeizzazione dell’Italia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003, 3 ff. 
60
On the relations between the European affairs committees and the sectorial standing 
committees, see FROMAGE, Standing Committees in Interparliamentary Cooperation in the 
Post-Lisbon Era: Towards the End of the European Affairs Committees’ Predominance?, in 
FASONE – LUPO (eds.), Interparliamentary cooperation in the composite European 
Constitution, Hart, Forthcoming. 
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– gave precedence to the role of the Committee competent in such matters, 
namely the Budget Committee. On 8 September 2014, the President of the Su-
pervisory Board, accompanied by the President of the German Financial Super-
visory Authority was heard before the Committee in a ‘closed-doors exchange 
of views’. 
Unlike the German Parliament, in France the Committee specialized in EU 
affairs has maintained its role of “dominus” of European procedures, and in that 
capacity on 16 December 2014 it proceeded to the public hearing of the Presi-
dent of the Supervisory Committee and the Secretary General of the National 
Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority. It is true that the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the French National Assembly do foresee a double membership (of 
sector Committee and European Affairs Committee). Nevertheless, this latter 
body did not even consider coordinating with the Budget Committee, for exam-
ple, by means of the calling of a joint hearing.  
The political implications at the basis of these different procedural 
choices cannot escape notice: in the Bundestag the interlocutors of the Supervi-
sory Board were deputies specialized in finance, banking and insurance matters 
and the very choice to proceed “with closed doors” constitutes further proof of 
the will of the German MPs to obtain non generic information perhaps unsuit-
able to being made public to the markets. On the other hand, in the French Na-
tional Assembly, the representatives of the Supervisory Committee were able to 
exchange views with a body with “transversal” competence and in fact the min-
utes of the meeting mirror the reality of an undoubtedly interesting debate but 
which is still focused on the “broad outlines” of the issues of banking supervi-
sion.  
The German Bundestag was furthermore the first – and until now the 
only – Parliament to have organized a hearing of the President of the Single 
Resolution Board setting in motion the powers foreseen by Regulation No. 806 
of 2014. Moreover, it is significant that this faculty was exercised not so much in 
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the perspective of oversight of the activity of the SRB – a body that was only es-
tablished a few months ago – as rather to ask the Board for an opinion with re-
gard to the national legislative measures for the implementation of Regulation 
No. 806 of 2014 being examined by the Bundestag. 
A further point concerns the role of the upper Chambers. At the moment, 
the only Upper Chamber to have exploited oversight powers in the context of 
the Banking Union is the Italian Senate. This is perhaps not fortuitous consider-
ing that the perfect Italian bicameralism does not penalize the competences of 
the Senate in policies regarding banking61. Nevertheless, on 23 June 2015, the 
Italian representative of the Supervisory Board, Ignazio Angeloni, intervened in 
the Finance and Treasury Committee during a fact-finding investigation already 
started by the Senate. Furthermore, the different formal framework that the 
Senate and the ECB gave to this meeting must be noted: while the President of 
the Finance Committee identified the juridical legal basis of the meeting in art. 
48 of the Rules of the Senate (hearings of experts during fact-finding investiga-
tions), in its website the Supervisory Board referred to an “exchange of opin-
ions” according to art. 21 of Regulation No. 1024 of 2013. 
Following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, some National 
Parliaments – and in particular those of Spain, Ireland and Belgium – attributed 
the competence for establishing the new “European powers” appertaining to 
National Parliaments to a bicameral Committee. It is foreseeable that great part 
of these systems will choose to extend also the competences regarding the 
banking Union to such bicameral Committees. This is furthermore a solution 
that in our opinion presents a number of drawbacks: there is no doubt that the 
setting up of a bicameral Committee within the differentiated bicameral sys-
tems has the advantage of contributing to a rebalancing of the positions be-
tween the two Houses. And however, also in this case the sectorial Committee 
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On the Europeanization of the upper Chambers, see KIIVER, The Early Warning System for 
the Principle of Subsidiarity. Constitutional theory and empirical reality, London – New York, 
Routledge, 2012, 62 ff.; ROMANIELLO, Second Chambers in EU Affairs, Roma, Pioda, 2015. 
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specialized in banking issues would end up being excluded from the dialogue 
circuit with the European institutions, thus accentuating competitive attitudes 
among National Parliaments and European decision-makers. The prudential su-
pervision and resolution policies – it must be stated once again – represent mat-
ters that are far too technical to be assigned to bodies having “transversal” 
competence. 
With specific reference to the implementation of internal Italian Parlia-
ment procedures, it is possible to anticipate four different scenarios.  
A first path could consist of a Rules of Procedure reform which aims to in-
troduce “ad hoc” tools for the implementation of art. 21 of Regulation No. 
1024/2013 and art. 46 of Regulation No. 806/2014. Nevertheless, this is the 
most stringent solution from a formal point of view, and at the same time it is 
the most difficult to accomplish. In the light of the current obstacles met by the 
reform projects of both the Chamber and the Senate, a formal modification of 
the Rules of Procedure is indeed improbable, at least in the short term. After all, 
the idea of a maintenance and upgrade of parliamentary law rules through typi-
cal procedures seems to have gone out of fashion within the Italian Parlia-
ment62. 
A second solution, which basically retraces the path followed by the 
Chamber on the occasion of the implementation of the National Parliaments’ 
European powers established by the Lisbon Treaty could consist in an opinion 
by the Committee on the Rules of Procedure (Giunta per il Regolamento). In this 
case, the Committees on the Rules of Procedure, with the exception of some 
adjustments, could limit themselves to applying the already existent procedures 
with an analogical interpretation (for example, equalizing the BCE and Single 
Resolution Board reports to the documents transmitted to the National Parlia-
ments within the political dialogue). Otherwise, they could adopt an opinion 
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See LUPO, “Codificazione” dei precedenti o valorizzazione della Camera? I presupposti 
dell’ipotesi di riforma del regolamento della Camera e alcune possibili integrazioni, in Oss. 
fon., 1, 2014; POLI, Dinamiche del sistema politico e formazione delle regole di diritto 
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with a more innovative character. However, the flippant recourse to “experi-
mental procedures” through recommendations by the Committee on the Rules 
of Procedure was subject to severe criticism by scholars (especially with regard 
to the adoption of “experimental procedures” in violation of the “nemine con-
tradicente” constitutional custom)63. 
The compliance of the internal procedures with the new National Parlia-
ments’ powers established in the Banking Union sector could also occur – this is 
the third scenario – on the basis of a Presiding Officer’s decision, possibly to-
gether with the Presiding Officers of the Finance and EU affairs Committees. 
This model is quite similar to the one followed after the Lisbon Treaty, when the 
experimental procedure concerning the subsidiarity scrutiny was defined 
through a letter of the Presiding Officer to the Committee’s Presiding Officer 64. 
Finally, in the light of the “culture” of the Italian Parliament, it is not pos-
sible to exclude that, after having experimented the “zero option”65 on the 
occasion of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty innovations, the Houses 
would decide to pass to the “below zero option”: keeping the current proce-
dural framework intact, abstaining from the use of the new powers established 
in the Banking Union field and at the most sending the European authority in-
formal letters of the Finance Committees (should it be necessary in agreement 
within their own Committee Board). 
There is no point in adding that it would be a pity: this minimalist ap-
proach would not help either to increase the transparency and democratic ac-
countability level within Banking Union governance or least of all to modernize 
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the Houses, which are nowadays called upon to Europeanize their organization 
and working modalities. 
 
7. The evaluation of the National Parliaments’ powers in the Banking 
Union governance is controversial: as seen, while some constitutional law 
scholars underline that these powers exceed the oversight function usually 
played by the National Parliaments towards the National Central Banks66, other 
scholars consider the role of the National Parliaments in the Banking Union gov-
ernance as insignificant67. 
Maybe, the truth is somewhere in-between: as the Monetary Dialogue 
experience has shown, the ex post parliamentary oversight powers can poten-
tially activate fruitful discourse dynamics with the purpose of making the Bank-
ing Union governance more transparent, more participant and consequently, 
more legitimate. This dialogue does not exclude but, on the contrary, implies 
that the ECB and the Single Resolution Board have the last word with regard to 
competences which, already before their transfer at European level, were in 
many Member States taken away from the entitlement of democratically 
elected organs68. 
Nor is it possible to underestimate the potential importance of the new 
information rights conferred to the European Parliament and National Parlia-
ments. As stated, also the enlargement of this category of parliamentary powers 
can represent a first answer to the problem of the “informational asymmetry”. 
This is a problem which has been identified by scholars as one of the main fac-
tors at the bottom of “Executive dominance issue”69. 
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Developing the Monetary Dialogue format, the introduction of a sort of 
“banking dialogue” – and therefore the empowerment of democratic oversight 
and parliamentary informational rights in the banking sector –identifies a fur-
ther indicator of the crossing (rectius, of the upgrade) of the old “communicat-
ing vases” paradigm. According to the doctrine inaugurated by the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht with Maastricht-Urteil, the devolution of powers at EU level is 
admissible insofar as this transfer is compensated by the transferring of the 
scrutiny and oversight powers by the National Parliaments to the European Par-
liament70.  
This conception of parliamentary democracy in Europe, long “ridden” by 
the European Parliament in order to lay claim to the strengthening of its own 
powers, tends to be overturned within a contest characterized by a plurality of 
parliamentary players in the EU institutional scenario. Besides the traditional 
channel of political representation offered by the European Parliament, the rep-
resentative democratic principle established by art. 10, par. 1 TEU has to be nur-
tured also by the National Parliaments’ contribution. Rather, it is on these last 
institutions that the attention of the scientific community is mainly focused to-
day because they present a wider innovation and improvement margin: with 
the risk, however, of compromising the good functioning of the EU decision-
making process in the case of the giving of a proper veto power to the National 
Parliaments. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the democratic accountability mechanism 
introduced within Banking Union governance offers a confirmation of one of the 
most relevant aspects of the Euro-national parliamentary system theory: the 
considerable extent of the informal activities (or anyway a low degree of for-
malization) which precede or follow the adoption of formal decisions and the 
natural calling for the discreet usage of persuasion powers. In other words, that 
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legal category of influence would be at issue which is something more than the 
consultation method and something less than co-decision71. 
On the other hand, it is not sufficient that Parliaments in Europe feel, in a 
more or less active manner, like a part of the system. Today it is also necessary 
that Parliaments “make the system”. In other words, the European Parliament 
and National Parliaments should overcome the traditional preconception ac-
cording to which an expansion of the European Parliament’s position would en-
tail a strengthening of National Parliaments in an inversely proportional way 
(and vice versa).  
During the next months we shall see whether or not the players of the 
Euro-national parliamentary system choose to interpret their own role within 
Banking Union governance in the light of the “coexistence” method or in coher-
ence with the opposite method of “cooperation”: in the first case, the parlia-
mentary bodies within the exercise of the oversight function will interact in the 
strictly indispensable measure to minimize the negative effects of the interfer-
ence (therefore, remaining anchored to a competitive approach in interparlia-
mentary relationships); in the second case, the European Parliament and Na-
tional Parliaments will propose to make this same interference convenient for 
the own position and for that of the “system” as a whole.  
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